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 ‘HOW IS METAPHYSICS 
POSSIBLE?’ 
 Kant’s Great Question and His Great Answer 
 Nicholas F. Stang 
 1. Introduction 
 There are at least two ways to be a ‘great’ philosopher. The ﬁ rst is to ask a  ques-
tion , either a question that has never been asked before, or one that has never 
been asked in precisely that way, or perhaps even to revive an old question that 
has been forgotten. The second is to give an  answer to a question, one that is 
more correct, more interesting, or more plausible—or whatever other virtues 
that answers to philosophical questions can have—than previous answers to that 
question. Of course, it is possible to do one without the other. Heidegger asked 
a question (‘What is being?’) that had been asked many times before in the 
history of philosophy, but which had, according to him, been forgotten. One 
can think that, in doing so, Heidegger was doing something ‘great’ in philosophy 
even if one thinks that the various answers he gave to that question over his 
lifetime were incorrect. Conversely, Frege gave a new answer to a question 
(‘What are numbers?’) that is almost as old as philosophy, an answer that is, 
arguably, better than any answer that had been given before. 
 Kant has the rare distinction of both asking new questions and offering sys-
tematic, plausible, and well-motivated answers to them. Rare, but not unique: 
Plato and Aristotle spring immediately to mind as philosophers who did both. 
Kant has the further distinction (also shared by Plato and Aristotle) of having 
done so in virtually every one of (what we now think of as) the main areas of 
philosophy: logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
science, ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics. While I think there is a way 
of seeing those questions, and those answers, as speciﬁ cations of a single question 
and a single answer (‘To what does reason answer?’ ‘Itself.’), I will focus, for the 
sake of space and because another chapter in this volume addresses Kant’s moral 
philosophy, on Kant’s achievement in metaphysics. 
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 While some of his early works from the 1750s and 1760s are outstanding 
works of philosophy and repay close attention, his claim to greatness rests on 
the  Critique of Pure Reason ( CPR : 1st edition 1781; 2nd edition 1787), and the 
‘Critical’ system of philosophy he constructed on its basis. This is a verdict shared 
by Kant himself, who wrote that ‘prior to the development of critical philosophy 
there had been no philosophy at all’ (Ak. 6:206). 1 
 Kant asks, and answers, many questions about metaphysics in the  CPR but 
they are all downstream of a single guiding question, a question he famously 
formulates in the Introduction to the second edition as ‘How is metaphysics 
possible as a science?’ ( B22). The ‘possibility of metaphysics’, however, can refer 
to several different things and, consequently, Kant’s main question contains at 
least three separate questions about the possibility of metaphysics: 
 1. How is metaphysics possible  epistemically ? How is it possible for us to attain 
 knowledge (or whatever epistemic state we are aiming for) in metaphysics? 
 2. How is metaphysics possible  scientiﬁ cally ? How is it possible for us to attain in 
metaphysics not only knowledge, but the systematically organized knowledge 
Kant calls ‘science’ ( Wissenschaft )? 
 3. How is metaphysics possible  semantically ? How is it possible for our claims to 
have the content, reference, and other semantic properties that they must have 
in metaphysics? 
 Each of these questions corresponds to a distinct way in which metaphysics 
might be defective: it might be epistemically defective because we can never 
acquire knowledge in metaphysics; it might be defective as a science because 
whatever knowledge we have of metaphysics can never rise to the level of a 
science; and it might be semantically defective because our claims can never have 
a properly metaphysical content or our concepts can never refer to properly 
metaphysical topics, and so forth. 
 Kant gives systematic answers to all three questions in the  CPR , but in a 
single chapter I cannot hope to address all of them. Much contemporary Kant 
scholarship has focused on Kant’s answer to (1) and the related problem of 
synthetic  a priori knowledge. Instead, I will focus on Kant’s answer to (3) and 
his account of the semantic possibility of metaphysics. 
 I do so for two reasons. First, I think that his semantic critique of pre-Kantian 
metaphysics is more fundamental to his overall argument than his epistemic 
critique is. Second, I think that Kant’s question about the semantic possibility 
of metaphysics is philosophically deeper than the other two and poses a powerful 
challenge even to contemporary metaphysics in the analytic tradition. 
 In addition to the distinction with which I began, one can also make another 
distinction in the ways that philosophers can be great. A philosopher can be 
great in virtue of making an important intervention in a speciﬁ c historical 
context, or in virtue of some contribution (for example, a question, or an answer) 
whose importance transcends its speciﬁ c historical context and can continue to 
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be signiﬁ cant long after that historical moment has passed. These are by no 
means mutually exclusive, and I will be arguing that Kant’s question about the 
semantic possibility of metaphysics is one such instance. 
 In section 2 I will argue that the core of Kant’s semantic critique of meta-
physics is a question about the  reference of metaphysical concepts: assuming that 
concepts in metaphysics refer, what explains this putative fact? In unpacking 
what this question means, I try to formulate it in terms more general than Kant’s 
speciﬁ c cognitive semantics, in order to facilitate the project of the rest of the 
chapter, in which I argue that neither pre- nor post-Kantian philosophers have 
adequately addressed it. 2 In section 3 I explain how Kant came to this question 
by generalizing a question that Hume raised about the concept of cause and 
effect; I then show why Kant’s predecessors (for example, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, 
and Baumgarten) lacked the resources to explain satisfactorily the reference of 
metaphysical concepts. In section 4 I examine contemporary metaphysics and 
theories of reference, and argue that it is at least questionable whether contem-
porary metaphysicians are better able to answer Kant’s question than pre-Kantian 
ones are. I argue that this ‘explanatory gap’ is a serious problem for such meta-
physicians, for it entails that they cannot explain why metaphysics is (semantically) 
possible. Kant’s question, then, is not only of historical interest; it also poses a 
deep challenge to the possibility of both pre-Kantian and contemporary meta-
physics, and thus constitutes a problem that any metaphysician should grapple 
with. In section 5 I explain Kant’s own answer to this question, while omitting 
(for reasons of space) his argument that this is the  only possible such answer. 
 The target audience for this chapter is not Kant specialists—their conviction 
that Kant was at least a very good philosopher can be taken for granted—but 
rather philosophers, especially metaphysicians, who remain unconvinced that 
Kant was really all that ‘great’ when it comes to metaphysics. Consequently, I 
will focus less on defending my interpretations of Kant’s texts than on motivat-
ing Kant’s question and his answer. 
 2. Kant’s Question 
 In a famous letter from 1772 to his former student Marcus Herz, Kant writes 
(Ak. 10:129): 3 
 I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something which, in my long 
metaphysical studies, I, as well as others, had failed to consider, and which in 
fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto hidden 
even from itself. I asked myself this question: What is the ground of the 
relation [ Beziehung ] of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object? 
 Later in this letter Kant announces the aim of systematically answering this 
question in a work that he anticipates will be done within three months. In fact 
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he did not ﬁ nish it for another nine years, and it appeared under the title  Critique 
of Pure Reason . Many streams in Kant’s thinking fed into the writing of the  CPR 
and its famous question, ‘How is metaphysics possible?’; but the aspect of that 
question on which I want to focus—‘How is metaphysics possible semantically?’—
begins with this passage in the letter to Herz. 
 Before we can understand why Kant’s question is important and innovative, 
we must ﬁ rst understand what it means. ‘What is the ground of the relation 
( Beziehung ) of that in us which we call “representation” to the object?’ First, 
‘representation’ ( Vorstellung ) is Kant’s general term for mental states (roughly 
equivalent to ‘idea’ in Locke or ‘perception’ in Hume). It becomes clear in the 
rest of the Herz letter, and in other texts, that Kant is particularly concerned 
with the relation of a speciﬁ c kind of representation to their objects: namely, 
concepts. At this point in his philosophical trajectory, he ﬁ nds the ‘relation’ of 
the other main class of representations (intuitions) to their objects relatively 
unproblematic. 4 Concepts are general representations: a concept does not represent 
an individual object; it represents a general class of objects (Ak. 9:91). Thus, my 
representation of all red objects is a concept (the concept < red >) while my 
representation of a particular ﬁ re truck is not. 5 While Kant’s question is originally 
raised at the level of representations  überhaupt , in this chapter I will be concerned 
with it only as a question about speciﬁ cally conceptual representation. Unpack-
ing Kant’s syntax slightly, the conceptual version of the question becomes this: 
what is the ground of the relation of our concepts to their objects? 
 However, it is harder to determine precisely what ‘relation’ between concepts 
and objects Kant has in mind in this passage. For the sake of brevity, I will 
simply state my own view: the relation in question is what is now called  reference . 
Kant is interested in the relation between general concepts and the entities and 
structures in the world they are ‘about’: for example, the relation between the 
concept < substance > and substantiality. 6 But some of our concepts are not like 
< substance >; they do not refer to anything at all. Kant’s examples of such ‘usurped 
concepts’ (A84/B116) are < fate > and < fortune >, but to this list we might add 
< witch >, < phlogiston >, and so forth. What explains the difference between the 
concepts that do refer and concepts that are merely ‘usurped’? Why do < water > 
and < substance > refer but < fortune > does not? Kant’s question is thus closely 
related to questions about linguistic reference that were discussed in mid- 
twentieth-century analytic philosophy (for example, ‘Why does ‘water’ refer to 
water?’). 7 Kant’s question differs from those questions about reference, though, 
in at least one crucial respect: he raises the question at the level of thought 
(concepts) rather than of language (words). However, as we will see, the Kantian 
question about the reference of metaphysical concepts (for example, < substance >) 
can also be raised in a linguistic register about the reference of terms (for example, 
‘substance’) in metaphysical theories. 
 In order to make Kant’s question dialectically relevant to as wide a range of 
views in metaphysics as possible, I want to remain as neutral as possible among 
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different theories of what reference is, so I will opt for a very minimal charac-
terization: reference is contribution to truth value. Our thoughts are true or 
false, and in some cases their truth conditions involve things in the world. ( There 
may also be analytic truths whose truth conditions do not involve anything in 
the world. 8 ) I will say that some items in the world are referred to by a thought 
if those items ﬁ gure in the truth conditions of the thought. 9 For instance, the 
thought  water is wet is true if and only if water is wet: since water ﬁ gures in the 
truth conditions of  water is wet , that thought refers to water. Intuitively, that 
thought refers to water because < water > refers to water, but this requires building 
more complexity into our toy semantics. For instance, if we say that in general 
 Fa is true if and only if the referent of ‘a’ is F, then  water is wet is true just in 
case whatever < water > refers to is wet. This only extends the notion of reference 
to singular terms; to extend it to terms in the predicate position, we need to 
add this:  Fa is true if and only if the referent of  a is in the extension of the 
referent of F. We can then ask, of some such pair of concept and referent, why 
that concept refers to that referent. This detour through some rather un-Kantian 
semantics underlines an important point: Kant’s question can be raised indepen-
dently of any particular theory of reference and, most importantly, independently 
of his own highly controversial semantic doctrines (for example, his subject-
predicate theory of judgment). 10 
 Given the centrality of the notion of reference to the rest of this chapter, it 
will be helpful to be as precise as possible at the outset. We must distinguish 
between three semantic features of a concept (or a word in our language): 
(1) its meaning, (2) its reference, and (3) its extension. For instance, the meaning 
of < substance > might be given by ‘that of which other things are predicated and 
is not predicated of anything else’. But this is separate from its reference. If there 
are no things that are ultimate subjects of predication (it is predicates ‘all the 
way down’), then < substance > fails to refer; assuming this is not the case, < substance > 
refers to  substance , which, for ease of exposition, we can think of either as the 
property of being a substance or as the  kind to which all substances as such belong 
(for my purposes, it will not matter greatly which we choose). The extension of 
< substance > is all individual substances. This is not to be identiﬁ ed with its refer-
ent. If some substances are generated or corrupted, the referent of < substance > 
does not change (it refers to substance) but its extension does. Separating reference 
from extension is crucial for understanding Kant’s question in the Herz letter. 
Kant’s question is not a purely metaphysical question at the level of objects (exten-
sions of concepts), such as ‘Why are there substances at all?’ or ‘What makes 
substances substances?’; it is the semantic question about why < substance > refers. 
It thus corresponds not to a purely physical question, such as ‘Why is there water?’ 
or ‘What makes a sample of water water?’, but instead to a semantic question 
about why < water > refers. 
 The Kantian question, ‘Why do our concepts refer to the objects they do?’, 
has its contemporary counterpart in the question, ‘Why do the words of our 
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language refer to the objects they do?’ Answering that question in general ( über-
haupt ) is no easier, but also no more difﬁ cult, than giving a general theory of 
linguistic reference. To the contemporary philosopher, as for the eighteenth-century 
philosopher, there are many candidates for such a theory (descriptive theories, 
causal theories, direct reference theories, etc.) and the challenge is to ﬁ nd a model 
that extends to all of the cases for which one wants to account. 11 The challenge, 
of course, is that some theories (for example, causal theories) are better suited to 
explaining some kinds of cases (for example, names for ordinary objects) than 
others (for example, names of numbers). Kant’s point in the letter to Herz is that 
none of the theories of conceptual reference given by his predecessors (theories 
of how our concepts are ‘related’ to objects) is much help at all in explaining 
why metaphysical concepts refer. And Kant’s point holds even today, with our 
much more sophisticated theories of reference, as I will argue in section 4. 
 Recall from above the two ways in which the possibility of metaphysics might 
be questionable: (i) we might question the epistemic possibility of achieving 
knowledge of our metaphysical theories, and (ii) we might question the semantic 
possibility of referring to anything using our metaphysical concepts. Kant does 
have an argument that calls into question the  epistemic possibility of acquiring 
knowledge in metaphysics: knowledge in metaphysics (he argues) must be both 
synthetic and  a priori , and so we require an explanation of how we could know 
something  a priori if it is not an analytic truth. However, I do not focus here 
on the problem of synthetic  a priori knowledge, for three reasons. First, I am 
making the case for the continuing relevance of Kant in metaphysics, and it is 
harder to show that the problem of synthetic  a priori knowledge remains one 
with which contemporary metaphysicians should be concerned, since many of 
them have jettisoned the analytic-synthetic distinction and few are committed 
to the strictly  a priori status of metaphysics. Second, I want to make a case for the 
(relative)  originality of Kant’s question, and there are good reasons to think that 
the problem of synthetic  a priori knowledge was known to Kant’s rationalist 
predecessors (though not under that name). 12 
 Third, and most important, the reference question is more fundamental than 
the problem of synthetic  a priori knowledge. Even if this problem were solved, 
or dissolved, the reference problem would remain. For instance, even if meta-
physics were thoroughly analytic (as many of Kant’s contemporaries held), we 
would still ask why these concepts that we are analyzing are about anything, 
rather than being empty concepts like < witch > or < phlogiston > or < fate >. Even 
if we abandoned the assumption that metaphysics must be strictly  a priori , and 
held that metaphysics is continuous with the natural sciences, and that its epis-
temology is broadly abductive (resting on inference to the best explanation), we 
could still ask why the concepts that ﬁ gure in these theories refer to anything. 
And even if we took a Kantian direction and held that metaphysical knowledge 
must be synthetic and  a priori and had an explanation of how such knowledge 
is possible, we would still need a  separate explanation of why the concepts that 
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ﬁ gure in such synthetic  a priori knowledge refer. The reference question is thus 
separate from, and more fundamental than, the knowledge question. 
 This raises two questions. What is so hard about explaining the reference of 
metaphysical concepts? And (why) must the metaphysician offer such an expla-
nation? I address these questions in the next section. 
 3. Kant’s Question Before Kant 
 While none of the pre-Kantian philosophers with whose writings I am familiar 
devotes the focused attention to the reference of metaphysical concepts that Kant 
does, it is not hard to ﬁ nd in their writings implicit or explicit answers to Kant’s 
question. In this section I discuss several of the more prominent such answers 
and argue that none of them succeeds. But ﬁ rst I want to discuss the relation of 
Kant’s question about metaphysical concepts to a similar question raised by Hume. 
 (i) Hume 
 In the Preface to the  Prolegomena Kant writes, ‘I freely admit that it was the 
remembrance of David Hume that awoke me from my dogmatic slumber’ (Ak. 
4:260). It is likely that Kant’s ‘remembrance’ was of Hume’s discussion of causation 
in the ﬁ rst  Enquiry , speciﬁ cally §VII (‘Of the Idea of Necessary Connection’). 13 
In that section Hume begins by formulating a more precise version of his famous 
‘copy’ principle: every simple idea (an idea not composed out of further ideas) is 
a copy of some impression, its ‘original’. Hume then inquires into what the ‘original’ 
of our idea of necessary connection could be and rejects various candidates. In 
Part II of §VII he argues that the only suitable impression is ‘a customary transition 
of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant’. Having observed one 
kind of object (for example, ﬁ re) constantly followed by another kind of object 
(for example, smoke), when we encounter the ﬁ rst object we immediately imagine 
the second object, and that feeling of imaginative transition is the ‘original’ of our 
idea of a necessary connection between the objects. 
 In the  Prolegomena Kant writes (Ak. 4:257): 
 Hume started mainly from a single but important concept in metaphysics, 
namely, that of the  connection of cause and effect (and of course, also its 
derivative concepts, of force and action, etc.), and called upon reason, which 
pretends to have generated this concept in her womb, to give him an 
account of by what right she thinks that something could be so constituted 
that, if it is posited, something else necessarily must thereby be posited as 
well; for that is what the concept of cause says. 
 Kant is here translating Hume’s question, formulated in terms of impressions, 
ideas, and copies, into the terms of his own cognitive semantics. An idea, for 
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Hume, represents (is an idea ‘of ’) more than just the individual impression from 
which it was copied (or the set of simple impressions from which it is copied, 
if the idea is complex) when it is imaginatively associated with other individual 
ideas that resemble the original impression in some determinate respect. 14 Ideas 
‘used abstractly’ in this way constitute Hume’s explanation of how we represent 
generality. They thus correspond to Kantian concepts. Hume’s copy principle, 
in Kantian terms, is his theory of how concepts (ideas) ‘relate to’ (refer to) their 
objects (impressions). In the  Prolegomena , and in the 1772 letter to Herz, Kant 
presents himself as raising Hume’s question about the idea of necessary connec-
tion, but detaches it from the copy principle and the rest of Hume’s speciﬁ c 
cognitive semantic theory: why do concepts (general representations) refer to 
their objects? But Kant also generalizes Hume’s question to all of the  a priori 
concepts of metaphysics (Ak. 4:260): 
 So I tried ﬁ rst whether Hume’s objection might not be presented in a 
general manner, and I soon found that the concept of the connection of 
cause and effect is far from being the only concept through which the 
understanding thinks connections of things  a priori ; rather, metaphysics 
consists wholly of such concepts. 
 But if Kant had read the  Treatise , 15 he would have known that Hume raises this 
problem not only about < cause-effect > but also about many of (what Kant would 
consider) the other  a priori concepts of metaphysics: possibility, existence, substance, 
personal identity, and so forth. Does this compromise the originality of Kant’s 
question? Yes, somewhat, but it does not eliminate it. For what Kant saw was 
that a version of ‘Hume’s problem’ arises even if one is not as radical an empiricist 
as Hume, and that contemporary non-Humean metaphysicians lacked an answer 
to this problem (see below). What is more, he not only saw that Hume’s problem 
generalizes (even on non-Humean premises); he saw ‘how’ to generalize it: it 
applies to all the  a priori concepts of metaphysics. Rather than treating this as a 
piece of Kantian technical terminology to be explicated in terms of other tech-
nical terminology, I will instead consider the role that the notion of ‘ a priori 
concept’ plays in the problem for metaphysics that Kant is trying to motivate. 
This will be easiest to see by looking at his reasons for thinking that another of 
his predecessors, Locke, failed to explain why metaphysical concepts refer. 
 (ii) Locke 
 Kant writes in the  CPR (A85/B117): 
 I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate 
to objects  a priori their transcendental deduction, and distinguish this from 
the empirical deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through 
experience and reﬂ ection on it. 
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 If the ‘relation’ of a concept to its object is the reference of that concept to that 
object ( those object s ) then a ‘deduction’ of a concept is an explanation of why 
it refers to objects. 16 Kant here distinguishes a ‘transcendental deduction’, which 
is said to be the only possible explanation of why  a priori concepts (like those 
in metaphysics) refer, from an ‘empirical deduction’, which explains why a 
concept refers by tracing it back to the experience from which it was abstracted. 
Kant explains a few pages later why such an ‘empirical deduction’ of metaphysi-
cal concepts like < cause-effect > is impossible (A91/B123): 
 If one were to think of escaping from the toils of these investigations by 
saying that experience constantly offers examples of a regularity of appear-
ances that give sufﬁ cient occasion for abstracting the concept of cause 
from them, and thereby at the same time thought to conﬁ rm the objective 
validity of such a concept, then one has not noticed that the concept of 
cause cannot arise in this way at all. [. . .] For this concept always requires 
that something A be of such a kind that something else B follows from 
it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule. 
 An empirical deduction of a concept explains why it refers, by tracing the 
concept back to an experience from which the concept was originally abstracted. 
We can think of this explanation as having roughly the following form: one 
experiences an object (for example, a cause-effect pair), one forms the concept 
of all other objects that resemble this object in relevant respects, and this concept 
refers to all other such objects that resemble the object in the relevant respect. 
One page earlier, Kant names Locke as a thinker who attempted to give such 
an ‘empirical deduction’ of the concept of causation. 17 
 It is worth taking the effort to understand Kant’s rejection of empirical 
deductions of metaphysical concepts because this remains a potentially attractive 
strategy for contemporary metaphysicians, many of whom are not wedded to 
the  a priori status of metaphysics. 18 Metaphysical concepts, according to this line 
of thought, are broadly ‘empirical’ concepts and their reference is explained in 
a fashion similar to that of other empirical concepts: one experiences an object 
with a certain property, one abstracts a concept of that property, and that concept 
then refers to any object with the relevant property. Kant rejects such an empiri-
cal deduction of < cause-effect > because, he claims, this is a concept of a necessary 
connection (the cause necessitates the effect) and experience never presents us 
with necessary connections. If correct, this undermines the possibility of an 
empirical deduction because, although we might experience events that stand in 
necessary connections, we do not experience them  as necessarily connected, and 
so nothing about our experience explains why our concept would have this 
modal content. This objection brings out a key feature of a Lockean empirical 
deduction: my experience of an object that is F only explains why my concept 
refers to all objects that are F if the property F can ﬁ gure in the content of my 
experience. On the Lockean picture, concepts get their content from the content 
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of experience. In Locke’s own terms, the ideas that I abstract can only represent 
qualities that resemble sensory ideas that I perceive. 
 But the Lockean has at least two responses to this Kantian argument. First, 
one might simply  deny that the content of experience is as modally impoverished 
as Kant here claims it is, 19 and insist (though Locke himself would not) that we 
simply  do experience the necessity of the relation of cause and effect. Second, 
one might point out that not all concepts in metaphysics are concepts of neces-
sary connections. Indeed, even in Kant’s own theory, it is far from clear that the 
categories of quantity and quality (for example, < unity >, < totality >, < reality >, 
< limitation >) have a modal content that cannot be present in experience. So the 
Lockean might hold that, regardless of whether or not < cause-effect > admits of 
an empirical deduction, many (most) other metaphysical concepts do. 
 However, Kant has the resources to respond to this defense of empirical deduc-
tions, for this modiﬁ ed Lockean story is ultimately no explanation at all. Translating 
Locke’s theory into Kant’s terminology, the Lockean explains the content of 
concepts (what properties they refer to) by means of the content of experience. 
But if our concepts are going to refer to a certain class of properties, we need 
an explanation of why properties of that class are represented in experience. 
 Simplifying slightly Locke’s complex distinction between primary and second-
ary qualities and focusing on the primary qualities of objects (for example, shape, 
size, volume), what explains the match between the properties (qualities) of the 
object and the content of the experience is a causal connection: some primary 
qualities in the object cause me to experience it as having those qualities (to 
perceive ideas that resemble those primary qualities). 20 This causal constraint allows 
the Lockean to explain why we are not massively mistaken in our formation of 
empirical concepts (Locke’s abstract ideas): we do not systematically form concepts 
of properties that objects lack, because the presence of those properties is among 
the causes of the experience whose content grounds the content of the concepts. 
What plays the corresponding role, in the Lockean picture, in the case of meta-
physical concepts? It is not enough for the Lockean to say that various metaphysical 
properties (causation, substantiality, unity, etc.) are represented in experience; in 
order to explain why concepts abstracted from such experiences refer to the 
properties (qualities) in objects, the Lockean must explain why those experiences, 
in representing such properties, do not suffer massive reference failure. 
 Ironically, the Lockean may be in the best position to explain this in the case 
on which Kant focuses: cause and effect. Arguably, the very causal powers of 
objects cause us to experience them as causally related. But this is not a promis-
ing strategy to pursue with other metaphysical concepts, which seem to refer 
to properties that are causally inert. Without substantial additional argumentation, 
the Lockean has given no explanation of why, for instance, the relation of inher-
ence by which an accident is  in a substance (Kant’s ﬁ rst category of relation) or 
the totality of a set of parts (Kant’s third category of quantity) plays a corre-
sponding causal role. There are thus good reasons, both in the eighteenth and 
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in the twenty-ﬁ rst century, not to look to a Lockean ‘empirical deduction’ for 
the explanation of why metaphysical concepts refer. 
 Finally, we can give a provisional account of what ‘ a priori ’ concepts are: 
concepts whose putative reference cannot be explained by an empirical deduc-
tion. It is because the concepts of metaphysics cannot be ‘deduced’ empirically 
that Kant seeks a different origin for them than experience, though his theory 
of the origin of  a priori concepts will not be our topic here. This also shows 
that there are  a priori concepts that are not speciﬁ cally metaphysical concepts 
(e.g., mathematical concepts). 
 (iii) Logicism 
 As I argue extensively in Stang (2016), Kant’s predecessors in the German ratio-
nalist tradition—Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten—hold what I call a ‘logicist’ 
account of possibility: it is possible that  p if and only if  p does not entail a 
contradiction. In particular, this entails that a concept is possibly instantiated if 
and only if the proposition that it is instantiated does not entail a contradiction. 
Assuming that the  a priori concepts of metaphysics are logically consistent (an 
assumption Kant grants) it follows that they are possibly instantiated, and hence, 
in this sense, refer at least to possible objects: they refer to the possible objects 
that instantiate them. 21 For convenience, I will refer to Leibniz, Wolff, and 
Baumgarten as  logicists . 
 Note, however, that from the fact that it is possible that there is an F it does 
not follow that F refers; it follows merely that  possibly F refers. This point—that 
the possibility that F refers does not entail that  there is an object (even a logically 
possible one) to which F refers—is closely related to Kant’s famous claim that 
existence is not a ‘real predicate’, a doctrine from which (on my reading) the 
logicists dissented. But even if we grant them the assumption that for every 
logically consistent concept there are logically possible objects that fall under it 
(and thus that  there are objects that may or may not exist), this shows merely 
that the logical possibility (consistency) of a concept establishes that it refers to 
logically possible objects. This answers Kant’s question about the reference of 
metaphysical concepts only at the cost of ‘lowering the bar’ for what counts as 
reference. On this view, a ‘usurped concept’ such as < fortune > (or < witch >) refers 
just as much as < substance >: since both are logically consistent, they refer to 
logically possible objects. But even the logicists would want to distinguish between 
usurped concepts and genuinely referring concepts, for without such a distinc-
tion, metaphysics is on a par with astrology and witchcraft. 
 To return to a point from the previous section, this is not a request for an 
explanation of why there are substances; that would be an explanation of why 
< substance > has a non-empty extension, not why < substance > refers. In fact, by 
parity of reasoning the logicist explanation in the previous paragraph of why, 
for example, < substance > is a concept of logically possible objects is merely an 
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explanation of why it has a non-empty extension: there are logically possible 
substances. It does not explain why < substance > refers to substance, which for 
our purposes we can think of as the property possessed by all substances. 22 One 
way of appreciating this point is that logically atomic concepts are, trivially, 
logically consistent, but this by itself does not explain why they refer, for it does 
not distinguish between referential logically atomic concepts (which compose 
all other meaningful concepts) and logically atomic concepts that do not refer. 
 In his 1763 work  The Only Possible Ground for a Demonstration of the Existence 
of God , Kant puts the point this way (Ak. 2:80–1; Kant 1992: 125): 
 Suppose that you can now no longer break up the concept of extension 
into simpler data in order to show that there is nothing self-contradictory 
in it—and you must eventually arrive at something whose possibility can-
not be analyzed—then the question will be whether space and extension 
are empty words, or whether they signify [ bezeichnen ] something. The lack 
of contradiction does not decide the present issue; an empty word never 
signiﬁ es anything self-contradictory. If space did not exist, or if space was 
not at least given as a consequence through something existent, the word 
‘space’ would signify [ bedeutet ] nothing at all. 
 Kant’s point is that the mere logical consistency of a concept does not explain 
why (in my terminology) it ‘refers to’ ( bezeichnet ,  bedeutet ) anything, because there 
can be logically consistent concepts that refer to nothing, as < space > would if 
space were impossible. Kant’s way of making this point is to distinguish between 
logical possibility and ‘real’ possibility (which we would now call ‘metaphysical’ 
possibility), which Kant repeatedly equates with the ‘thinkable’. In his pre-Critical 
metaphysical works of the 1760s, Kant argues that not all logical possibilities are 
really (metaphysically) possible: not all logically consistent concepts refer to really 
possible properties. The question then becomes that of why metaphysical concepts 
refer to really possible properties, and not merely to logically possible properties. 
 But this might seem to beg the question against the logicists, who think that 
logical possibility entails real (metaphysical) possibility. However, while the logicists 
maintain,  contra Kant, that logical and ‘real’ (metaphysical) possibility are coex-
tensive, they acknowledge that these are separate notions, for these have distinct 
deﬁ nitions. A logically possible concept is one that contains no mutually con-
tradictory marks (sub-concepts). What Kant calls ‘real’ possibility, however, they 
ground in the unlimited perfections of God. A logically atomic concept refers 
to some inﬁ nite perfection possessed by God (for example, understanding, power, 
will) and a logically consistent complex concept refers to some really (metaphysi-
cally) possible property composed of unlimited divine perfections. It follows that 
C is logically consistent if and only if it refers to some really possible property. 
The logicists thus seem to have a well-thought-out answer to Kant’s question 
about concept reference: a concept refers to really possible (not merely logically 
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possible) property just in case it is a logically consistent combination of atomic 
concepts of unlimited divine perfections. 
 Kant’s pre-Critical works contain several complex and controversial arguments 
that real and logical possibility are not coextensive, 23 which have been extensively 
critically discussed by scholars. 24 However, I think that, in addition to the argu-
ments that Kant gives explicitly, it is relatively clear, from a Kantian point of 
view, that the logicists have simply assumed precisely what stands in need of 
explanation: why do my concepts refer to the really possible properties to which 
they refer? Since the reference of complex concepts is explained by the reference 
of their atomic constituents, we can formulate this at the level of atomic concepts: 
why do my atomic concepts refer to unlimited divine perfections? The principal 
logicist answer to this question, shared by Leibniz and Baumgarten, is that God 
created me with a concept (or at least the capacity to come to reﬂ ective aware-
ness of this concept) referring to that property. But then the Kantian question 
becomes this: In virtue of what did God do this? It is not enough, when pressed 
for an explanation, to simply say ‘God did it’; one must say what God did, and 
why, in virtue of doing that, he made it the case that the semantic relation of 
reference obtains. If we assume that semantic facts about what concepts refer to 
are not brute facts (a premise accepted by all of the logicists), then there must 
be some fact p in virtue of which my concept < substance > refers to substantiality, 
and God created me with a concept that refers to substantiality in virtue of 
making it the case that p; what, then, is p? Nor will it help for the logicist to 
claim that concepts are individuated by their referents: if it is essential to my 
concept < substance > to refer to really possible substances, in virtue of what did 
God create me with this very concept with this content, < substance >, rather than 
another one (e.g., a usurped one, like < fortune >)? 25 It is not clear that logicists 
can answer this question. 
 Further pursuing this question within rationalist metaphysics would take us too 
far aﬁ eld. In this section I hope to have established that Kant’s question about the 
explanation of metaphysical concept reference poses a deep challenge to the meta-
physics of his forebears. In the next section I will argue that it is by no means 
clear that contemporary metaphysicians are in a better position to answer it. 
 4. Kant’s Question Today 
 Since the question of metaphysical concept reference is, to my knowledge, even 
less discussed in contemporary metaphysics than it was in early modern philoso-
phy before Kant, most of the ‘answers’ to Kant’s question that I will consider 
are my own reconstructions from the contemporary literature, as are the ‘Kantian’ 
responses that I will discuss. Most contemporary theories of reference are theories 
about linguistic rather than conceptual reference, so in this section I will for-
mulate Kant’s question, and potential responses, in terms of the reference of 
linguistic terms in metaphysical theories. 
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 Description 
 One might think that the reference of a term like ‘substance’ can easily be 
explained by thinking of it as a disguised descriptive term: ‘substance’ just means 
‘individual with properties, which is not itself a property of some further indi-
vidual’. ‘Substance’ refers just in case the description refers. But this merely 
pushes the explanatory burden back one step; we need an explanation of why 
‘individual’ and ‘property’ refer. This is why Kant raises his question about the 
categories, the basic metaphysical concepts in terms of which other metaphysical 
concepts are deﬁ ned. 26 
 Elimination and Defl ation 
 Some contemporary metaphysicians deny, in Kant’s terms, that metaphysical terms 
refer. Hofweber (2009), for instance, argues that syntactically singular terms for 
numbers, properties, and propositions do not have the semantic function of 
referring. Philosophers like Hofweber might thus be said to  eliminate reference 
from metaphysics. 27 Other philosophers might be said to  deﬂ ate the reference of 
metaphysical terms. According to the ‘easy’ approach to ontology defended by 
Thomasson (2015), sortal terms like ‘number’ or ‘property’ or ‘proposition’ are 
associated with application conditions, where it is analytic that, if the application 
conditions are satisﬁ ed, an object of the relevant sort exists and thus that the 
term refers. For instance, it is analytic (on Thomasson’s view) that if Beyoncé’s 
dress is red, then her dress has the property of being red and thus that ‘property’ 
refers. On Thomasson’s view, there is nothing more to the reference of these 
sortal terms than the satisfaction of their application conditions. Neither the 
eliminativist nor the deﬂ ationist need be bothered by Kant’s question about 
metaphysical reference. The eliminativist denies the explanandum while the 
deﬂ ationist can explain it (or explain it away) all too easily: she can simply point 
to the fact that the application conditions are fulﬁ lled. Consequently, Kant’s 
question poses no problem for the contemporary metaphysical eliminativist or 
deﬂ ationist. Kant’s question poses a problem for the theorist who holds that 
reference is a substantive relation that partly explains why our metaphysical 
theories are true. As we will see below, there are several such theorists on the 
contemporary scene. I will refer to them as  non-deﬂ ationary realists . 28 
 Explanation by Division 
 Some readers versed in contemporary philosophy may be unimpressed with 
Kant’s question in the ﬁ rst place, for they will think that it is all too easy to 
answer. Its appearance of difﬁ culty, they will say, depends on a conﬂ ation of a 
psychological with a ‘Platonic’ (or Fregean) notion of a concept. If we distinguish 
between concepts as psychological entities or capacities and the meanings of 
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those concepts—‘Concepts’ in the Fregean sense—then we can see that the refer-
ence of a given term divides without remainder into three factors: (i) the fact 
that our term expresses a Concept, (ii) the fact that that Concept has the mean-
ing it does, and (iii) the fact that that Concept refers to what it does. 29 The ﬁ rst 
fact is a semantic one and admits of a semantic explanation, if any. The second 
fact is partly constitutive of what it is to be that Concept: Concepts are indi-
viduated by meanings, so it is part of what it is to be a given Concept to have 
the meaning that it does—for example, part of what it is to be the Concept 
< substance > is to be a Concept of individuals with properties. Finally, there is 
some fact about what the Concept refers to. In the case of ordinary empirical 
terms, whether the Concept refers and what it refers to will depend upon con-
tingent facts about the world. For instance, the Concept expressed by the deﬁ nite 
description ‘the sixth Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic 
Republic’ does not refer, and the fact that the Concept expressed by ‘water’ in 
the mouths of English-speakers on Earth refers to water depends on the con-
tingent fact that water, rather than XYZ, is in our environment. 30 
 But the terms of metaphysical theories are presumably not like this; they refer 
necessarily, so there is a purely metaphysical explanation, if there is any explana-
tion at all, of why a Concept with a given meaning refers. 31 Even if we reject 
the assumption that metaphysical concepts refer necessarily if they refer at all, 
and allow that it might be contingent that, for instance, < substance > refers, the 
important point still stands: the explanation of (iii) will be at the level of pure 
metaphysics, for it will be an explanation of why a Concept with some given 
meaning refers. For instance, it might be that the meaning of our term ‘substance’ 
is the Concept < substance >, whose meaning is given by: x is a substance if and 
only if x is an individual with properties. This Concept with this meaning refers 
because, for purely metaphysical reasons, there must be individuals with 
properties. 
 The problem with this explanation by division is that, by giving distinct 
explanations of these three factors, it leaves unexplained why the very same 
Concepts expressed by terms in our language refer. It remains, on this ‘multifac-
tor’ view, a mystery why, in forming metaphysical theories, we do not massively 
misﬁ re and use terms that express Concepts that fail to refer. 
 Compare the three-factor explanation of metaphysical concept reference to 
a ‘three-factor’ explanation of why we have true beliefs: (i) we form beliefs 
(understood as psychological states) that (ii) express certain propositions that 
essentially have certain truth conditions, and (iii) those propositions have their 
truth conditions satisﬁ ed by the concrete realm. The ﬁ rst fact admits of a purely 
psychological explanation, the second fact is explained by the essence of these 
propositions (they are individuated partly by their truth conditions, let us sup-
pose), and the third fact has a purely physical explanation (why the concrete 
realm satisﬁ es the truth conditions constitutive of the relevant propositions). But 
this story by itself leaves unexplained why we have  true beliefs: the facts that 
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make the propositions true play no role, within this story, in explaining why we 
form beliefs that express those propositions. Likewise, in the three-factor expla-
nation of metaphysical concept reference, the fact that these metaphysical Concepts 
refer plays no role in explaining why there are terms in our theories that express 
them. Notice that this is not the case with concepts and beliefs about objects 
in our sensible environment: a given sensible fact (for example, the fact that 
there is coffee in my cup) or the fact that a given Concept refers (for example, 
the fact that < coffee > refers to that coffee) partly explains why we form a psy-
chological belief that expresses a true proposition (the belief that there is coffee 
in the cup) or a term (‘coffee’) that expresses a referring Concept. But this 
explanation depends upon our sensory awareness of our environment, and in 
section 3 we saw some anti-Lockean reasons to be skeptical that perceptual 
experience can explain the reference of metaphysical concepts or the terms in 
metaphysical theories. 
 No Special Problem 
 Another dismissive response that a contemporary metaphysician might give to 
Kant’s answer is that there is no special problem about metaphysics. We can raise 
explanatory questions about the reference of terms in any domain: natural sci-
entiﬁ c, mathematical, and so forth. If metaphysics is, in this respect, on a par 
with other sciences, then it would seem that Kant has failed to show that meta-
physics is especially problematic. It would be nice to have an explanation of 
reference in metaphysics, but it would also be nice to have such an explanation 
in physics, mathematics, and so forth. There is no more reason, in the absence 
of such an explanation, to be skeptical of metaphysics than there is to be skepti-
cal of physics or mathematics. 
 Recall that Kant’s question is not the skeptical epistemic question: how do 
we know that metaphysical terms refer? It is an explanatory question: what 
explains the fact (assuming it is a fact) that metaphysical terms refer (‘relate to 
their object’)? 32 Once we recognize that Kant’s question is fundamentally a 
demand for explanation, however, the ‘no special problem for metaphysics’ response 
is, to a great extent, dissolved. For there are explanations available of why the 
terms in physical theories refer. The most plausible of them rest, I take it, on 
notions like ‘natural kind’ (or on the more general notion of ‘joint carving’—see 
below) and have something like the following form: the terms in our best sci-
entiﬁ c theories refer to the natural kinds that make them (approximately) true, 
if they are approximately true. 33 Kant’s question is about the very terms used to 
explain why terms in natural science refer: why, for instance, does ‘natural kind’ 
refer to natural kinds? If we lack an answer to Kant’s question, this does not 
undermine our claim to knowledge in physics. It shows, at most, that physics 
rests on an assumption—that its terms refer—an assumption that is explained 
only in the distinct science of metaphysics. So, in a certain sense, physics depends 
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on metaphysics. But the nature of the dependence is explanatory, not justiﬁ ca-
tory. The lack of an explanation of metaphysical reference does not ramify into 
skepticism about our knowledge of physical theories, nor does it undermine 
the ‘metaphysical’ explanation of why physical terms refer; it shows merely that 
this explanation relies on an assumption (that ‘natural kind’ refers) that is not 
itself explained, a feature shared by (presumably) all explanations. It shows, at 
most, that metaphysics cannot ‘look after itself ’—it cannot explain one of its 
basic assumptions (that its terms refer) and it cannot appeal to some more 
fundamental science, because it is, allegedly, the most (explanatorily) fundamental 
science. 34 
 Reference Magnetism 
 Finally, one might look to the idea of ‘reference magnetism’ for an explanation. 
The core idea of reference magnetism views is that certain entities (properties, 
concept extensions, etc.) are intrinsically more natural or ‘suitable to be referred 
to’ than others, and this is what breaks the tie among candidate referents that 
equally satisfy the descriptive contents of our theories. One might exploit a 
similar idea in explaining the reference of metaphysical terms: the world has a 
privileged metaphysical structure, and  ceteris paribus our terms ‘carve’ the world 
at the joints of that structure. 35 However, for reasons of length, and because I 
criticize reference magnetism at length elsewhere, I will forgo any further discus-
sion of this kind of explanation. 
 5. Kant’s Answer 
 Having explained the meaning of Kant’s question, and why various pre-Kantian 
and contemporary answers to it are less than fully successful, I will now explore 
Kant’s own answer, his own explanation of why metaphysical concepts refer. As 
in the rest of this chapter, I will not be following Kant’s text especially closely, 
both for reasons of brevity (fully grounding my interpretation in the texts would 
require much more space than I have here) and because my primary aim remains 
making the salience of Kant’s question and his own answer to it clear to con-
temporary audiences. 
 The key idea in Kant’s own explanation of why metaphysical concepts refer 
is a deceptively simple one: something may have a different structure in itself 
than it has in relation to something else. For instance, a cow in itself has a certain 
anatomical structure: these and those organs related in such and such a way. But 
in relation to our practice of butchery, a cow has a quite different structure. A 
butcher (quite literally) carves a cow at different joints than an anatomist does: 
in relation to butchery, a cow divides into the edible and inedible ( bone, skin, 
certain organs) parts, and edible parts divide into various ‘cuts’ (top round, sirloin, 
etc.) that are in no sense the natural ‘joints’ of the cow. 36 This is an especially 
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literal (and perhaps gruesome) example, but other examples abound. The physical 
elements have a certain structure, which is given by the periodic table of ele-
ments. The ‘natural joints’ among the physical elements are, for instance, the 
inert gases, the metals, the halogens, and so forth. But in relation to human 
biology the physical elements have a different structure with different joints. In 
relation to human biology the physical elements divide into (perhaps overlap-
ping) classes such as those that are poisonous to humans, those that are essential 
constituents of our bodies, and so forth. The intuition behind the Lewis-Sider 
idea of naturalness and joint carving is that some ways of dividing things up are 
objectively more correct than others. But even when we consider some entity 
(cow) or system of entities (the elements) in relation to something else ( butchery, 
human biology), we can still distinguish ways of dividing them up that are more 
‘correct’ than others. For instance, in relation to butchery, dividing a cow into 
the front and back half is objectively incorrect; you would be doing butchery 
wrong if you divided the cow that way. Likewise, in relation to human biology, 
dividing the elements into those with odd and those with even atomic numbers 
is objectively incorrect; that is not a natural joint in the physical elements, even 
in relation to human biology. 
 Let us concentrate on one particular example of the difference between the 
structure of something in itself and its structure in relation to something else: 
the structure of the world in its own right (the topic of metaphysics, according 
to Wolff, Baumgarten, and Sider) and the structure that the world has in cogni-
tive relation to us. Now, this distinction can be many different distinctions, 
depending on what cognitive relation is speciﬁ ed. For instance, the world might 
have a different structure ‘in itself ’ than in relation to our beliefs about that 
structure, if our beliefs are mistaken about that structure. Likewise, the world 
might have a different structure ‘in itself ’ than it has insofar as it is perceived 
by us. The world as perceived by us has a certain structure (spatiotemporal 
objects in motion with various perceptible properties) but, if current physics is 
accurate, the structure that it has in itself is quite different. 
 Kant holds that the subject matter of metaphysics should be understood, not 
as the nature of the world in itself and its structure, but as the structure of the 
world in cognitive relation to us. The relevant cognition relation is not  belief or 
 perception ; it is what Kant calls  Erkenntnis . This, however, is a technical term in 
his philosophy, so it provides little independent purchase on what relation he 
has in mind. This is reﬂ ected in the now standard translation of  Erkenntnis as 
‘cognition’, which is itself a technical philosophical term without a very precise 
meaning independent of the uses to which particular philosophers put it. 
 Because this is not primarily an exegetical chapter, I will simply cut to the 
chase and state what I take to be the closest analogue in contemporary philosophy 
to Kantian  Erkenntnis , namely, understanding. 37 Applying this back to the idea 
with which we started, we can distinguish between the structure that the world 
has in itself and its structure as  understood by us. It is important to understand 
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that this is not the distinction between the structure that the world has in itself 
and the structure that we merely  believe it to have. The difference arises from 
the difference between the state of understanding and the state of belief. These 
cognitive states are individuated by an internal standard. The individuating 
standard of belief is truth: one’s belief that  p is a successful belief (it satisﬁ es the 
standard that makes belief what it is) when it is the case that  p . What is the 
internal standard of successful understanding, the standard that (partly) individu-
ates this achievement as the achievement that it is? One answer would be this: 
one understands X successfully when one carves X at its joints, when one 
understands the structure of X in itself. But this is not Kant’s view about under-
standing. His view is that understanding has its own internal standard and 
structure that may be distinct from the structure of the object of understanding. 
Our understanding has, so to speak, its own terms, which may not be the ‘terms’ 
(  joints) in the world itself. We successfully understand something when we 
understand it on our terms. The ‘terms’ of our understanding are the structure 
of anything understandable by us, and this is dictated, according to Kant, by the 
nature of our minds,  not by the structure of the thing itself. 
 An example might be helpful. Consider teaching the deﬁ nition of a deriva-
tive to a student. You ﬁ rst try to get the student to understand the notion of a 
converging sequence of real numbers, then you deﬁ ne the ﬁ rst derivative of a 
real-valued function at a point as the limit of a converging sequence of slopes. 
But your student cannot understand it in these terms; he can only understand 
it in visual-geometric terms: the derivative is a line orthogonal to a curve at a 
given point, and so forth. Your student has understood something, and that 
understanding has its own internal standard by which the student can succeed 
or fail in a given instance. For instance, if the student, given the curve for the 
function  f ( x ) =  x 2 , thinks that the tangent of the curve at the origin points in 
the direction of the positive  x -axis, he has failed to understand even according 
to the internal standard of his own visual-geometric understanding of what a 
tangent is. Likewise, the student has understood by his own standard if he real-
izes that the tangent is null at that point. The student has understood something 
about what you have taught him (the notion of a tangent) but has not understood 
it in its own terms: he has not understood the rigorous deﬁ nition of a derivative 
as the limit of a converging sequence of slopes. Kant’s point is that we are always 
in the position of this student: our minds are equipped with a set of concepts 
in terms of which we understand anything at all. Anything we can understand, 
we understand in these terms. These concepts describe the structure of any 
understanding we can possess, and thus they describe the structure of anything 
 as understood by us . 
 It is not hard to see how to turn this into an explanation of why our concepts 
in metaphysics refer. First, we must distinguish two kinds of metaphysics—what 
Kant would call, in turn, ‘immanent’ metaphysics and ‘transcendent’ metaphysics 
(see A296/B352). The object of immanent metaphysics is the world  as 
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understandable by us . Its object is not the world  as actually understood by us , for 
that is far more determinate and partly depends upon empirical discoveries in 
the natural sciences. One of the things we actually understand about the world 
is that the earth is billions of years old, but this does not mean that a world in 
which the earth is much younger is not understandable by us. The subject of 
immanent metaphysics is, so to speak, the complete space of how the world can 
be understood (not what actually happens to be understood). It is not about 
that space ‘piecemeal’; it is about its structure, its joints: the topic of immanent 
metaphysics is the structure of the world as understandable by us. Kant’s view, 
as we have seen, is that the structure of the world as understandable by us is 
determined by the structure of our own intellects. So there is a direct translation 
between the structure of our understanding of the world and the structure of 
the world as understood by us. The basic concepts of metaphysics are the most 
basic structures of our understanding: any understanding of anything is structured 
by those concepts. So the world as understood by us is structured by those 
concepts, which means that those concepts refer: they refer to joints, not in the 
world as it is in itself, but in the world as it is understood by us. 
 The topic of transcendent metaphysics, by contrast, is the world as it is in 
itself, the structure that it has in its own right, not in relation to anything else. 
We have seen that both the pre-Kantian rationalists and some contemporary 
philosophers take this to be the appropriate topic of metaphysics. The point of 
Kant’s question—why do the basic metaphysical concepts refer?—is that the 
transcendent metaphysician cannot explain why her metaphysical concepts refer. 
Since the aim of metaphysics, on this view, is to correctly map the structure of 
the world in itself, and since that requires having concepts or terms that refer 
to that metaphysical structure, the transcendent metaphysician, if Kant is correct, 
cannot explain why transcendent metaphysics is possible. The practitioner of 
immanent metaphysics, on the other hand, can: since the structure of our under-
standing is the structure of the world as understood by us, then, if some set of 
concepts provides the structure of any possible understanding for any topic, those 
concepts refer to the joints in the world as understandable by us. To some, this 
may seem like it simply changes the topic: ‘immanent’ metaphysics is not really 
metaphysics at all. But if metaphysics is identiﬁ ed with transcendent metaphysics, 
then Kant’s conclusion is simply that the possibility of reference in metaphysics 
is inexplicable. Only in immanent metaphysics, the heir to traditional metaphys-
ics, is the reference of our concepts explicable. 
 Kant raised a question—how is metaphysics possible?—that has multiple dimen-
sions: he inquires into the epistemic, the scientiﬁ c, the metaphysical, and the 
semantic possibility of metaphysics. I have focused on the semantic aspect of this 
question, which I take to mean: why do the basic concepts of metaphysics ‘relate 
to their objects’—that is, refer to them? I have argued that no one in the pre-
Kantian or the post-Kantian tradition has a particularly successful answer to this 
question. Kant’s proposal is to reconceive metaphysics as the immanent science 
‘How Is Metaphysics Possible?’ 207
of the structure of the framework in which we understand the world, and I have 
argued that we can explain how the basic concepts of that science refer. Kantian 
immanent metaphysics can answer the question about its own possibility that 
traditional transcendent metaphysics could not. If this does not constitute a great 
achievement in philosophy, I don’t know what does. 
 Notes 
  1 See Förster (2012) for a discussion of what Kant meant by this astonishing claim. ‘Ak’ 
refers to the  Akademie edition of Kant’s writings (Kant 1902), which I cite by volume 
and page number. The  CPR I cite in the standard A/B format. Translations of the 
 CPR are from Guyer and Wood (Kant 1998). 
  2 I borrow the term ‘cognitive semantics’ as a description of Kant’s theory from Hanna 
(2001). 
  3 Translation, with slight modiﬁ cations, from Kant (1999: 133). 
  4 Kant alludes to the relation of empirical intuitions to their objects in the Herz letter 
itself (Ak. 10:130–1). He had outlined his theory of  a priori intuitions and their rela-
tion to their objects (space, time) two years before in his ‘Inaugural dissertation’,  De 
mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (Ak. 2:385–419; translation in Kant 
1992). 
  5 I use angle brackets to denote the concepts that would normally be expressed by the 
italicized expression within: for example, < substance > is the concept of substance. 
  6 This is not the relation between < substance > and its extension, the set of substances. 
< Substance > would still have ‘its object’, even if it had a different extension (if one 
fewer or one more substance were to exist), so the ‘object’ of a concept (for Kant) is 
not its extension. I argue for this at length in Stang (forthcoming  b ). 
  7 Much of those debates were concerned with the reference of singular terms (names, 
deﬁ nite descriptions) and indexical expressions; Putnam (1975) expands these issues to 
the case of natural-kind terms like ‘water’. 
  8 In the course of criticizing the ontological argument for the existence of God, Kant 
points out that there can be true analytic judgments involving concepts that are not 
instantiated by any objects (e.g., ‘God is omnipotent’ is true, even if there is no God). 
See A595–6/B622–3. 
  9 Obviously, there are complicated issues here about tense and context-sensitive expressions 
like indexicals and demonstratives, which, for reasons of space, I cannot discuss here. 
 10 This also allows us to extend the notion of reference beyond the reference of singular 
terms to objects and predicates to properties. For instance, if we adopt a primitivist 
modal metaphysics on which modal facts do not obtain in virtue of anything non-
modal we can give the truth conditions of modal sentences as follows: ‘◊p’ is true if 
and only if possibly p. In this case we could say that the modal operator ◊ ‘refers’ to 
possibility, since possibility facts contribute to truth conditions of sentences that involve 
it. Henceforth, to indicate that ‘referents’ can in principle be a broader category than 
objects I will speak of reference to ‘entities and structures’. 
 11 See Devitt and Sterelny (1999) and Davidson (2007) for an overview of the issues and 
the present state of the debate. 
 12 For instance, by Crusius’s theory of the highest material principles of thought; for 
discussion, see Heimsoeth (1956) and Hogan (2013). 
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 13 Which of Hume’s writings Kant had read, and, in particular, whether he had read the 
 Treatise , is a matter of controversy among scholars. See Kuehn (1983); Kreimendahl 
(1990); and Beiser (2002: 43–7). 
 14 These are what Garrett (1997) calls ‘revival sets’ for ideas used abstractly. 
 15 Beiser (2002) offers this as further evidence that Hume had not read the  Treatise. 
 16 In Stang (forthcoming  b ) I argue that Kant’s locution ‘ the object of a concept’ never 
refers to the extension of a concept, much less to an individual object in that exten-
sion, but instead to what we might now call the ‘content’ of a concept. 
 17 See Locke (1975: bk. II, ch. XXI, §§1–4). 
 18 For example, Sider (2011: 162) and Williamson (2013: 423). Neither Sider nor Wil-
liamson would be attracted, though, to a Lockean ‘empirical’ deduction of the key 
terms in their metaphysical theories. 
 19 See Stang (forthcoming  a ) for extensive discussion of the modal content of Kantian 
experience ( Erfahrung ). 
 20 More precisely, the primary qualities of the body ground the object’s power to produce 
in me ideas that resemble these qualities. In actual sense perception, these powers are 
activated and I come to perceive ideas that resemble qualities in bodies. Cf. Locke’s 
 Essay (1975: bk. II, ch. 8). 
 21 Careful readers will notice that this involves a transition from a claim of the form 
◊∃F x to a claim of the form ∃(F x & Possible( x )), where Possible( x ) is a predicate of 
objects rather than an operator on propositions. While many would reject the validity 
of this inference, I argue in Stang (2016) that Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten are 
committed to the validity of this transition where F is an ‘essential concept’ (it picks 
out an object by its essential properties). 
 22 For ease of exposition I am going to be a bit cavalier about the exact ontological status 
of the referent here. 
 23 I reconstruct these arguments in detail in Stang (2016: ch. 3). 
 24 For critical discussion, see Chignell (2009); Stang (2010, 2016); Abaci (2014); and Yong 
(2014). 
 25 Note that this is not the question, ‘Why (for what reason) did God create me with 
this concept?’ 
 26 The derivative concepts are what Kant calls ‘predicables of pure reason’: see A82/B108. 
 27 Fictionalism about a problematic class of entities might also be thought of as eliminat-
ing reference to those entities: see, for instance, Rosen (1990) for a ﬁ ctionalist account 
that  eliminates reference to (Lewisian) possible worlds. 
 28 In forthcoming work, I explore the relation of metaphysical deﬂ ationism to Kant’s own 
‘transcendental method’ in metaphysics and I raise some Kantian (and post-Kantian) 
problems for the deﬂ ationist. 
 29 Fourth, there is the extension of the Concept, the set of things to which it correctly 
applies, but I will pass over that here. 
 30 I am assuming that ‘water’ expresses the same Concept in Earth English and in Twin-
Earth English but refers to different things. But little in my argument hangs on this 
assumption; it is merely an illustration. 
 31 One could consider a view on which there are ‘externalist’ effects in the reference of 
metaphysical concepts (e.g., ‘substance’ refers to different things, depending on what 
world it is tokened in), but I will forgo discussion of that here. 
 32 This means that Kant is not committed to the implausible skeptical claim that, without 
a satisfactory explanation of the reference of, for instance, the terms of physics, our 
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putative knowledge of physics is jeopardized. We might have knowledge in physics 
even if we lack second-order knowledge of how this knowledge is possible (among 
other things, why physical terms refer in the ﬁ rst place). 
 33 Nor do I think that these considerations are foreign to Kant. See his account of why 
we must assume that the ‘system’ of our empirical concepts must track the ‘system’ of 
nature in the Appendix to the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ section of  CPR A642/B670–
A668/B696. 
 34 At this point I anticipate yet another buck-passing move in the assertion that explain-
ing the reference of metaphysical terms is the job of semantics. But a semantic theory 
that explains the reference of terms in metaphysics is going to have to include quite 
a lot of metaphysics; whether this is called ‘semantics’ or ‘metaphysical semantics’ or 
the ‘semantics of metaphysics’ is a matter of indifference to me. 
 35 For the original idea of naturalness as an explanation of reference see Lewis (1984) in 
response to Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). Sider (2011) is the most developed contem-
porary version of the idea that the world has a privileged metaphysical structure. 
 36 I owe this example to an unpublished paper by Laura Franklin-Hall. 
 37 There is now a small—but growing!—literature on  Erkenntnis and how (and whether) 
it differs from knowledge,  Wissen . See Smit (2000); Hanna (2006); Watkins and 
Willaschek (2017); and Schafer (forthcoming). 
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